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PARTY’S OVER: ADMISSIBILITY OF POST-TRIAL JUROR
TESTIMONY SHOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE
CONDUCT
Justin Gillett*
What do you call a weeklong period in which you and a
handful of acquaintances drink alcohol every day at lunch, 1 sleep
though the afternoons,2 smoke marijuana 3 and ingest a couple
lines of cocaine on occasion?4 You call it the time when a jury
convicted Anthony Tanner and William Conover of conspiracy to
defraud the United States and commit various acts of mail fraud. 5
Under a current rule of evidence, which precludes juror testimony
to impeach a verdict except on extraneous prejudicial
information, juror intoxication is not an external influence about
which jurors may testify. 6 A new test for the admissibility of posttrial juror testimony should be adopted so that juror testimony
regarding jurors’ consumption of drugs and alcohol during breaks
can be received. 7

*
J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 136 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2.
Id. at 135.
3.
Id. at 136.
4.
Id.
5.
See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 136.
6.
Id. at 125 (citing FED. R. E VID. 606).
7. Juror testimony admissibility after Tanner has been the subject of several
scholarly articles, some proposing reform. See, e.g., Mark A. Corti, Tanner v. United
States Did the Court Go Too Far in Its Interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(B)? ,
3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 49, 57–58 (2001) (proposing judicial determination of
misconduct in an in camera hearing); Benjamin T. Huebner, Note, Beyond Tanner: An
Alternative Framework for Postverdict Juror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.1469, 1491 (2006)
(proposing several “practices for addressing juror testimony that would more effectively
serve the relevant policy interests” of Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)); Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men:
Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 170 (2011)
(proposing mechanisms to reduce the influence of bias during deliberations and allowing
evidence of biased juror statements where the juror materially misrepresents biases on
voire dire). This note proposes that admissibility of juror testimony should turn on one
principal: its ability to be objectively verified.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF JUROR MISCONDUCT DEPENDS ON
THE NATURE OF THE CONDUCT
In both criminal and civil cases, judges may order a new trial
if juror misconduct prejudiced the losing party and affected the
jury’s verdict. 8 The admissibility of evidence tending to prove
misconduct depends on the nature of the conduct involved. 9
Subjective internal matters, such as “the juror’s motives, the effect
of jury discussions on the juror, and the reasoning processes of the
juror,” are inadmissible because they are considered to inhere in
the verdict. 10 Conversely, objective external matters, such as overt
acts, are not considered to inhere in the verdict and are generally
admissible. 11 For example, evidence of inappropriate material
conveyed to a juror is admissible objective external evidence, but
testimony about the effect that such evidence had on the juror is
inadmissible subjective internal matter. 12
In criminal trials, juror intoxication implicates a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to an unimpaired jury. 13 It is “widely
agreed” that the overt act of drinking intoxicating liquors during
the course of a trial is improper. 14 The resulting state of
intoxication can impair a juror’s ability to carry out his or her
responsibility to make a rational judgment based upon the
evidence presented. 15 Therefore, judges should be able to grant a
new trial when juror intoxication results in prejudice to the losing
party. 16
POST-TRIAL JUROR TESTIMONY REGARDING DELIBERATIONS IS
8.
24 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §633 (2010).
9.
Id.
10. Id. (“[T]hose matters which inhere in the verdict are those which are personal to
the juror and subjective in nature .… [M]isconduct relating to the motives, beliefs, or other
mental operations or emotions of a juror are considered subjective matters, or matters
which inhere in the verdict.…”).
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing City of Columbia v. Lentz, 282 S.W.2d 787, 787 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955)).
13. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .…”); Tanner v, United States,
483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (citing McIlwain v. United States, 464 U.S. 972, 976–77 (1983)
(“[D]ue process may well require the granting of a mistrial whenever a trial judge finds that
a juror, already engaged in deliberations, is so drunk that the deliberations must be
recessed.”)).
14. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §633 (2010).
15. Id.
16. See id.
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LIMITED FOR EXPRESS POLICY REASONS
Though juror intoxication is held to be misconduct, admissible
sources of evidence to prove such misconduct is limited. In order
to promote the justice and finality of jury findings, and to protect
jurors from harassment and exploitation by unsatisfied litigants, 17
post-trial juror testimony regarding deliberations is limited. 18
Limitations on testimony regarding deliberations are meant to
promote the “full and free debate” during deliberation that is
necessary to attain just verdicts. 19 The fear is that, without the
prohibition on post-trial scrutiny of jury deliberations, juror
discussions would be less frank, and jurors would be less willing to
return an unpopular, though just, verdict. 20 Further, if litigants
were able to attack jury findings based on jury deliberations,
many verdicts would be followed by investigations into those
deliberations in the hopes of finding evidence of juror
misconduct. 21 This would disrupt the finality of juries’ findings of
fact. 22 Such investigations would also invite juror harassment, and
even exploitation of disgruntled jurors. 23
ADMISSIBILITY OF POST-TRIAL JUROR TESTIMONY DEPENDS ON
THE SOURCE OF THE CONDUCT
To prevent the potential issues described above, the Federal
Rules of Evidence outline the allowable scope of juror testimony
in an inquiry into the validity of a verdict. 24 During such an
inquiry, juror testimony relating to deliberations, effects on jurors’
votes, and jurors’ mental processes is limited to existence of
prejudicial information, outside influences, and verdict form
errors. 25

17. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 124 (citing the U.S. Senate’s finding that inquiries into
internal jury deliberations “would permit the harassment of former jurors by losing parties
as well as the possible exploitation of disgruntled or otherwise badly-motivated ex-jurors”).
18. E.g., id.
19. Id. at 124.
20. Id. at 120-21.
21. Id. at 119-20.
22. Id. at 120.
23. Id. at 120, 124.
24. FED. R. EVID. 606.
25. Id. The pertinent text of the rule reads:
(b) During an Inquiry Into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment.
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In Tanner v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
confirmed that, according to the Rules of Evidence, juror
testimony that relates to external influences is admissible, and
that which relates to internal influences is not. 26 However, the
Tanner Court proceeded to exclude post-trial juror testimony
regarding juror alcohol and drug use during trial as an
inadmissible internal influence. 27 It so held even though the jury
showed external signs of intoxication.28
PROPOSED REFORM: ADMISSIBILITY OF JUROR TESTIMONY SHOULD
TURN ON ITS ABILITY TO BE OBJECTIVELY VERIFIED; OBJECTIVE
VERIFICATION IS A PROXY FOR INHERENCY
Admissibility of juror testimony should turn on its ability to be
objectively verified. Testimony regarding subjective internal
matters that inhere in the verdict, such as discussions and
activities during deliberations that betray mental operations of a
juror, 29 are unverifiable. Thus, they should be protected
inadmissible matters. However, external objectively verifiable

(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s
deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s
vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or
indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a
juror’s statement on these matters.
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought
to the jury’s attention;
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any
juror; or
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict
form.
26. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117 (“The [internal/external] distinction was not based on
whether the juror was literally inside or outside the jury room when the alleged
irregularity took place; rather, the distinction was based on the nature of the allegation.”).
27. Id. at 125 (“[J]uror intoxication is not an ‘outside influence’ about which jurors may
testify to impeach their verdict.”).
28. Id. at 126 (refusing to grant a new trial even if it were true that “several of the
jurors fell asleep at times during the afternoon”).
29. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §633 (2010) (“[T]he essence of the distinction
[between subjective and objective misconduct] is that misconduct relating to the motives,
beliefs, or other mental operations or emotions of a juror are considered subjective matters,
or matters which inhere in the verdict, whereas misconduct relating to extraneous matters,
overt acts, or external matters are considered objective matters, or matters that do not
inhere in the verdict.”).
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matters do not inhere in the verdict. 30 Juror testimony regarding
objectively verifiable conduct that affects the outcome of the
deliberations can be considered, while still protecting the
promotion of “full and free” debate necessary to attain just
verdicts.
ADMISSIBILITY OF JUROR TESTIMONY THAT TURNS ON
INHERENCY WOULD OPTIMIZE THE OCCURRENCE OF FAIR RESULTS
In isolation, both promoting full and free debate and inquiring
into jury decisions foster fair results. When combined without
restriction, however, post-trial scrutiny of jury deliberations would
undercut frank debate and detract from the overall likelihood of
fair results. The test for admissibility of post-trial judicial
testimony should strategically permit post-trial juror testimony
that safeguards a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an
unimpaired jury 31 without unduly discouraging the full and free
debate necessary to attain just verdicts.
The complete lack of juror accountability is not necessary for
full and free deliberations, nor does it best promote the higher
aim of attaining just verdicts. Verdict accountability for factors
that affect a jury’s ability to perform its duty would lead to better
jury function. Permitting jurors to testify to matters that do not
inhere to the verdict, such as jurors’ consumption of drugs and
alcohol during breaks, would provide such accountability. By
definition, only matters that inhere in the decision can constrain
full and fair debate. 32 Thus, such a test for the admissibility of
post-trial juror testimony would increase the quality of trial
outcomes without unduly constraining full and free deliberations.
An inherency-based test would not unduly affect the finality of
verdicts nor expose jurors to undue harassment and exploitation.
The test would only permit a narrow inquiry based on objectively
verifiable conduct. By definition, matters that do not inhere to the
verdict, such as overt acts, are objective matters. 33 Thus, any postverdict inquiry would be strictly limited to adducing evidence that
is admissible even under the current test.
30. Id.
31. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .…”).
32. See supra text accompanying note 10.
33. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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The admissibility test for post-trial judicial testimony should
turn on the nature of the evidence proffered. Such a test would
optimize the occurrence of fair results by balancing the promotion
of “full and free debate” with the ability to inquire strategically
into the validity of an individual verdict, and would not unduly
affect the finality of verdicts or expose jurors to undue harassment
and exploitation.

